

TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY TODAY

REMUNERATION REPORT 2025

LPKF

Remuneration Report

INTRODUCTION

The Remuneration Report describes the principles and structure of the compensation for the Management Board and Supervisory Board of LPKF Laser & Electronics SE ("LPKF") and reports on the compensation granted and owed in the 2025 financial year to the current and former members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board. The report was prepared by the Management Board and the Supervisory Board in accordance with the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

1. REVIEW OF THE 2025 FINANCIAL YEAR

1.1 APPROVAL OF THE 2024 REMUNERATION REPORT

The Remuneration Report, prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), concerning the compensation granted and owed to the current and former members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board in the 2024 financial year, received approval from 81.67% of the votes at the Annual General Meeting and was thus approved. The Management Board and the Supervisory Board regard this vote as confirmation of the transparency and comprehensibility of the format used.

1.2 REVIEW OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD REMUNERATION SYSTEM

The remuneration system approved by the 2023 Annual General Meeting was applied unchanged in the 2025 financial year. The Supervisory Board did not identify any need for adjustment during its annual review.

1.3 PERSONNEL CHANGES

The extended service contract of Dr. Klaus Fiedler as Chair of the Management Board came into effect on 1 January 2025. The contract term is four years, ending on 31 December 2028. Dr. Fiedler is responsible for strategy, sales and marketing, human resources, operations, and research and development. In addition, Dr. Fiedler assumed responsibility for investor relations on the Management Board with effect from 1 October 2024.

Mr. Peter Mümmeler was appointed to the Management Board (CFO) for a term of three years, effective 1 April 2025. His Management Board service contract ends on 30 March 2028. Mr. Mümmeler is responsible for Finance, Controlling, Digital & IT, Purchasing, and Legal and Compliance.

The term of office of the Supervisory Board Chair Jean-Michel Richard ended with the conclusion of the Annual General Meeting on 4 June 2025. Alexa Siebert, a member of the Supervisory Board since June 2023, was appointed as the new Chair. Paul Owsianowski, investment manager and partner at Active Ownership Group, was newly elected to the Supervisory Board. Apart from the changes mentioned above, the rest of the Supervisory Board remains unchanged. Members—including Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ludger Overmeyer, Dr. Dirk Rothweiler, and Anka Wittenberg—support the work of the committee.

On 22 July 2025 the Supervisory Board unanimously decided that strategy issues would once again be addressed at regular Supervisory Board meetings. This means that the previous Strategy Committee will be dissolved. The aim of this decision was to make committee work more efficient and reduce the additional costs of separate committee meetings.

Since this decision, the following committees have been in place:

- Audit, Risk and ESG Committee: Alexa Siebert (Chair), Paul Owsianowski, Anka Wittenberg
- Compensation and Nomination Committee: Anka Wittenberg (Chair), Dirk Rothweiler, Alexa Siebert

The composition of the committees reflects the expertise of the members in the respective subject areas. The Audit, Risk, and ESG Committee monitors accounting, the internal control system, risk management, and sustainability aspects in particular. The Compensation and Nomination Committee prepares resolutions on executive compensation and the filling of management positions.

2. COMPENSATION OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD

2.1 PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT BOARD REMUNERATION

The remuneration of the Management Board is a key control element in the implementation of LPKF's corporate strategy and growth ambitions. This includes providing the right incentives for implementing and executing the corporate strategy in full. With this in mind, the performance targets for the performance-based remuneration components include financial and sustainability-related targets. To increase the focus on LPKF's long-term development, the LTI is the largest component of the performance-based remuneration. In order to support the share culture at LPKF and bring the interests of the Management Board into alignment with those of shareholders and stakeholders, the LTI is designed as a share-based remuneration component and share ownership guidelines are in place for the Management Board.

2.1.1 PROCESS FOR DETERMINING MANAGEMENT BOARD REMUNERATION

The Supervisory Board, in consultation with its Remuneration and Nomination Committee, establishes the remuneration system for the members of the Management Board. The remuneration system adopted by the Supervisory Board is submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval. After significant changes have been made, and at least once every four years, the Supervisory Board shall

resubmit the remuneration system to the Annual General Meeting for approval. The current remuneration system was approved by the Annual General Meeting in 2023 with a majority of 97.65% of the votes and was applied in all cases to those members of the Management Board serving in the 2025 financial year.

2.1.2 APPROPRIATENESS OF THE COMPENSATION FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

The compensation for members of the Management Board is determined by the Supervisory Board. In accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act, the Supervisory Board ensures that the compensation is commensurate with the duties and performance of each individual member of the Management Board, as well as with the economic situation of the company, and that it does not exceed the regular market level without special reasons.

With that in mind, the Supervisory Board regularly reviews the appropriateness of the remuneration structure, taking into account a horizontal and vertical remuneration comparison in accordance with the German Corporate Governance Code.

The horizontal comparison compares the remuneration of the LPKF Management Board with Management Board remuneration in comparable companies (peer group). In the last horizontal comparison in February 2024, the following European companies for electronic devices and components were used as the peer group:

Company, Location	Company, Location
Basler, Germany	Manz, Germany
centrotherm, Germany	Mühlbauer, Germany
Dr. Hönle, Germany	Nynomic, Germany
First Sensor, Germany	PVA TePla, Germany
IQE, United Kingdom	Sequans Communications, France
Judges Scientific, United Kingdom	Stemmer Imaging, Germany
Kalray, France	SÜSS MicroTec, Germany
Lumibird, France	Viscom, Germany

The main criteria for identifying suitable peer companies were industry, revenue and market cap. Based on the positioning at that time, LPKF was in the 40th percentile in terms of revenue and in the 60th percentile in terms of market cap.

The appropriateness assessment also included consideration of the Management Board remuneration in relation to the remuneration structures within LPKF. The development of the Management Board's compensation was compared with the compensation of the senior management (defined as the first management level below the Management Board) and the compensation of the workforce as a whole (defined as the average compensation of full-time employees of LPKF SE in Germany). When doing so,

the Supervisory Board did not find any indication that it had developed disproportionately or establish any grounds for adjusting it.

2.1.3 TARGET REMUNERATION

The employment contract for each member of the Management Board sets out their target remuneration, which is paid for 100% achievement of the targets set for the performance-based remuneration components. The target remuneration amount is based on standard market rates and is largely dependent on the knowledge and experience relevant for the role of the respective Management Board member.

Target remuneration								
	Dr. Klaus Fiedler (CEO) (since 1 January 2022)				Peter Mümmeler (CFO) (since 1 April 2025)			
	2025		2024		2025		2024	
	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %
Base salary	350	49	350	50	225	48	-	-
Fringe benefits ¹⁾	18	3	6,6	1	23	5	-	-
Total non-performance-based target remuneration	368	51	357	50	248	52	-	-
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	140	19	140	20	90	19	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	210	29	210	30	135	29	-	-
Total performance-based target remuneration	350	49	350	50	225	48	-	-
Total target remuneration	718	100	707	100	473	100	-	-

¹⁾ The values for fringe benefits reflect the fringe benefits actually incurred in the fiscal year.

2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE COMPENSATION OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD IN THE 2025 FINANCIAL YEAR

The remuneration system for members of the Management Board of LPKF is geared toward long-term and sustainable company development. The total remuneration comprises non-performance-based and performance-based (variable) components. The non-performance-based components include a fixed annual salary (basic salary) as well as incidental benefits and benefits in kind.

The performance-based components consist of a short-term variable compensation (STI), which relates to the achievement of economic targets within a year, and a long-term variable compensation (LTI), which is measured over several years and is based on shares. In addition, penalty and clawback provisions, share ownership guidelines and a maximum remuneration are an integral part of the remuneration system. The company does not offer any pension or early retirement schemes for members of the Management Board.

	Component	Parameter	Objective
Non-performance based	Base salary	Paid in equal monthly installments at the end of each month	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reflects the role on the Management Board, experience, area of responsibility and market conditions • Ensures adequate income, to prevent inappropriate risks from being taken
	Fringe benefits	Benefits in kind, company car (alternatively, cash allowance or flat rate for a rental car), insurance premiums	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grant of market customary fringe benefits in order to offer an attractive remuneration package
Performance-based	Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	Target amount: approx. 40% of performance-based remuneration Plan type: target bonus Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 75% corporate targets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 37,5% Revenue • 37,5% EBIT margin • 25% personal targets Cap: 200% of target amount	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentivizing the (over)achievement of annual corporate targets • Implementation of important milestones of the corporate strategy and sustainability aspects through personal targets • Rewarding the individual contribution to success and sustainability
	Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	Target amount: approx. 60% of performance-based remuneration Plan type: Performance Stock Option Plan Plan term: Eight years <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four-year waiting period (including a three-year performance period) • Four-year exercise period Performance criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40% Relative TSR • 40% ROCE • 20% ESG-targets Exercise price: average closing price during the last 30 trading days before allocation Cap: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The final number of performance stock options is limited to 150% of the provisionally allocated performance stock options. • The payout is limited by the maximum remuneration. Servicing: in shares	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting the long-term growth of LPKF and incentivizing the creation of long-term shareholder value • Linking the interests of the Management Board members with those of the shareholders • Incentive to (over)achieve long-term financial and sustainability targets • Promoting the share culture at LPKF
Other key regulations	Maximum remuneration	EUR 2.0 million per Management Board member	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limiting the total remuneration for a financial year
	Share Ownership Guidelines	SOG target: 100% of gross base salary Build-up: obligation to invest in LPKF shares amounting to at least 50% of the net STI payout per year until the SOG target is reached Condition: Performance stock options can only be exercised once the SOG target has been reached	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking the interests of the Management Board members with those of the shareholders • Promoting the share culture at LPKF
	Malus / Clawback	Partial or full reduction / clawback of performance-related remuneration possible Compliance malus and clawback as well as performance clawback implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening the position of the Supervisory Board in the event of incorrect financial statements and intentional gross breaches of material duties by a member of the Management Board
	Severance payment cap	Maximum severance payments of two years' basic remuneration; may not exceed the remuneration for the remaining term of the contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevents inappropriately high payments due to premature termination of the Management Board contract
	Company pension scheme	No company pension scheme for the members of the Management Board and therefore no pension or early retirement arrangements	

2.3 APPLICATION OF REMUNERATION COMPONENTS IN THE 2025 FINANCIAL YEAR

The components of the remuneration system and their specific application in the 2025 financial year are explained in detail below.

2.3.1 NON-PERFORMANCE-BASED REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

2.3.1.1 BASIC REMUNERATION

The members of the Management Board receive basic remuneration, which is paid in equal monthly installments at the end of each month. It is reviewed at regular intervals by the Supervisory Board and adjusted where necessary.

2.3.1.2 FRINGE BENEFITS

In addition to basic salary, incidental benefits are granted to each member of the Management Board. These benefits include benefits in kind provided by the company, the use of a company car, contributions to health and care insurance and other types of insurance as well as absorption of other costs as is customary for the market.

The company car is also intended for personal use. As an alternative to a company car, Management Board members may also be offered a cash allowance or a flat rate for a rental car.

In the 2025 financial year, there was also Directors & Officers (D&O) insurance for the members of the Management Board with a deductible in accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act.

2.3.2 PERFORMANCE-BASED REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

2.3.2.1 SHORT-TERM VARIABLE REMUNERATION (STI)

How it works

The STI is designed as a target bonus and the target amount is set at around 40% of the performance-based remuneration. The payout amount depends on the achievement of corporate targets, which are based on the company's financial performance, and on the achievement of personal targets.

The corporate objectives consist of two key financial metrics for LPKF's corporate management and are weighted at 75% (37.5% each):

- Revenue according to the audited, consolidated annual financial statements of LPKF
- Consolidated operating EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) as a percentage of consolidated group sales according to the audited consolidated annual financial statements of LPKF (EBIT margin)

The personal goals for each member of the Management Board are weighted at 25% and are agreed upon annually at the beginning of each financial year. Up to four personal targets may be set. Using


personal targets enables the Supervisory Board to provide incentives for achieving important strategic objectives which may also be non-financial in nature and include, for example, environmental, social or governmental aspects (ESG targets).

Both personal and corporate targets may be achieved within a range agreed each year between the Supervisory Board and the Management Board, which has a floor and a cap. With regard to the achievement of targets, the following percentages of the agreed target amount will be paid:

- Below the lower threshold: 0%
- Equal to the lower threshold: 25%
- Target: 100%
- Equal to the upper threshold: 200%
- Above the upper threshold: 200% (maximum amount)

A linear adjustment will be carried out for figures in between.

To calculate overall target achievement, the average of the respective target achievement for personal and corporate targets is determined in each case. The average figures calculated in this way are then multiplied by the respective weighting factor and added together to calculate overall target achievement.



Targets and extent to which targets were achieved for the 2025 financial year

At the beginning of the 2025 financial year, the Supervisory Board stipulated the following target figures and thresholds for the corporate targets and calculated the following target achievement levels based on actual figures:

Performance criteria	Lower threshold (25 % target achievement)	Target (100 % target achievement)	Upper threshold (200 % target achievement)	Target achievement
Net revenue (k€)	130,400	134,700	140,000	0%
Operating EBIT margin	7.2%	9.2%	10.3%	0%
Corporate targets				0%

On the basis of the consolidated financial statements, the target achievement level for the corporate targets was set at 0% for the 2025 financial year.

The Supervisory Board has set the following personal targets for the 2025 fiscal year:

- Further development of the corporate strategy
- Implementation of the Welding strategy with a focus on cost optimization and site consolidation
- Improvement of working capital efficiency

These targets apply to both members of the Management Board jointly. This is intended to underscore the expectation that the Management Board will jointly address the priorities set by the Supervisory Board.

At the end of the fiscal year, the Supervisory Board determined that 82.5% of the personal targets had been achieved based on the results obtained, taking the following aspects into account:

Corporate Strategy

In fiscal year 2025, the Management Board made significant strides in advancing the company's strategic development. The comprehensive analysis of the market and competitive landscape, as well as the derivation of a clear strategic positioning and portfolio orientation, were fully implemented. On this basis, differentiated business models and growth strategies were defined for the key business segments, and corresponding resource requirements were identified.

The specification of strategic measures and the development of a structured implementation plan with prioritized initiatives were largely completed during the reporting year, though some aspects were still in the process of being implemented. Internal communication and the embedding of the long-term corporate strategy were initiated and largely implemented, though not fully completed within the planned timeframe.

The definition of a comprehensive KPI system for the systematic measurement of progress and success, as well as external capital market communication of the strategy, were not realized during the reporting year.

Welding Strategy

In the Welding division, measures to optimize structure and improve efficiency were initiated during the reporting year. The planned consolidation of locations was conceptually prepared and launched operationally.

However, the targeted sustainable reduction in personnel costs compared to the previous year could not yet be achieved during the reporting period, as key implementation measures were postponed to the following year. The expected effects will therefore not take effect until fiscal year 2026.

To improve working capital efficiency, the cash conversion cycle was significantly reduced. The set target was thus exceeded.

This results in the following STI payouts for the 2025 financial year, based on the individual target amounts and the target achievement for the corporate and personal targets:

STI payout 2025					
STI payout for 2025 financial year					
	Target amount in €k	Target achievement			Payout amount in €k
		Corporate targets (Weighting: 75%)	Personal targets (Weighting: 25%)	Overall	
Dr. Klaus Fiedler	140	0%	83%	21%	29
Peter Mümmler	90	0%	83%	21%	19

2.3.2.2 LONG-TERM VARIABLE COMPENSATION (LTI)

How it works

The LTI is designed as a Performance Stock Option Plan, which is allocated on an annual basis with a target amount of approximately 60% of the performance-related compensation and a plan duration of eight years.


At the beginning of the LTI tranche, the members of the Management Board are allocated a preliminary number of Performance Stock Options (PSO), which is calculated by dividing the LTI target amount by the fair value of a Performance Stock Option at the time of allocation.

The final number of performance stock options depends on the achievement of financial and ESG targets during a three-year performance period. The Supervisory Board set the development of LPKF's total shareholder return (TSR) compared to an individually determined peer group and the return on capital employed (ROCE) as financial targets, both weighted at 40%. The ESG targets are weighted at 20% and are determined annually for each LTI tranche using a predefined catalog of ESG criteria. The final number of performance stock options can be between 0% and 150% of the provisional number

of performance stock options. The provisionally allocated performance stock options must be held for four years (“waiting period”). The waiting period is followed by an exercise period of four years. Accordingly, the final number of performance stock options can be exercised four years after the allocation date at the earliest.

The value of each performance stock option at the time of exercise is the difference between the LPKF share price on the exercise date and the average closing price of LPKF shares on the last 30 trading days prior to the allocation date (“exercise price”). In addition to the limit on the final number of performance stock options, the payout amount for each LTI tranche is limited by the maximum remuneration defined in the “maximum remuneration” section in accordance with Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act.

The 2024 Annual General Meeting has approved the creation of conditional capital to service subscription rights. The LTI 2025 was therefore granted as real share options in the form of Performance Stock Options (PSOs).



Allocations from the long-term incentive (LTI) in the 2025 financial year

In the 2025 financial year, a tranche of the LTI was allocated to the members of the Management Board on 28 March 2025 ("LTI 2025"). The valuation of the granted share options was carried out using a Monte Carlo simulation, which resulted in a fair value per option of EUR 1.85.

LTI 2025 - 2032						
Overview LTI 2025 - 2032						
	LTI target amount in €k	Fair Value at allocation in €	Number of provisional PSO	minimal number PSO	maximum number PSO	Exercise price
Dr. Klaus Fiedler	210	1,85	113.514	0	170.271	8,58
Peter Mümmeler	135	1,85	72.973	0	109.460	8,58

Achievement of the target for the LTI is based on the total shareholder return (TSR) and return on capital employed (ROCE) financial performance criteria as well as on sustainability-related targets.

The TSR represents the return on LPKF shares; the share price is taken into account on the assumption that dividends will be reinvested. The TSR performance of LPKF is measured in comparison to the following peer group, which is defined by the Supervisory Board and consists of selected competitors:

Company, Location	Company, Location
Aixtron, Germany	PVA TePla, Germany
Basler, Germany	SMA Solar Technology, Germany
centrotherm, Germany	SÜSS MicroTec, Germany
Comet, Switzerland	technotrans, Germany
Dr. Hönle, Germany	Viscom, Germany

In order to measure relative TSR performance, LPKF's TSR performance and that of the comparable companies is ranked over the three-year performance period. Achievement of the target is calculated based on the resulting positioning of LPKF within the peer group.

The ROCE refers to the ratio between consolidated operating EBIT and capital employed. The decisive factor is the average ROCE over the three financial years of the performance period. Prior to commencing allocation, the Supervisory Board determined a target value and lower and upper thresholds. Achievement of the target is calculated based on the actual three-year average ROCE.

In addition to financial performance criteria, the LTI contains 20% ESG targets in order to anchor LPKF's sustainability strategy firmly in the remuneration system for the Management Board. To this end, prior to the issuance of the LTI tranche 2025 allocated in the reporting year, the Supervisory Board selected the following two specific ESG goals from a list of criteria, each with equal weighting, as performance criteria, which relate to the criteria of sustainable value chain and employee engagement:

- Increase the percentage of system sales revenue from products that fully meet the specified and agreed key performance indicators (KPIs) to 95% (weighting 10%)
- Decrease the average turnover rate of employees in business-critical positions to 5% (weighting 10%)

LTI 2025 - 2032

Targets and thresholds LTI 2025 - 2032				
	Weighting	Lower threshold (50% target achievement)	Target value (100% target achievement)	Upper threshold (150% target achievement)
TSR	40%	25th percentile	50th percentile	75th percentile
	Weighting	Lower threshold (0% target achievement)	Target value (100% target achievement)	Upper threshold (150% target achievement)
ROCE	40%	16,2%	21,0%	25,8%
ESG: Zero Defects Operation	10%	90%	95%	100%
ESG: Fluctuation of Key Talents	10%	6%	5%	4%

Compensation granted and owed from long-term variable compensation in the 2025 financial year

Due to the change from a former LTI with a one-year performance period to the current LTI with a four-year vesting period in the 2023 financial year, there were no payments to be considered as compensation granted and owed in the 2025 financial year.

2.4 COMPENSATION CAPS ("CAP") AND MAXIMUM COMPENSATION

Remuneration for members of the Management Board is limited in two respects. Firstly, the performance-based remuneration components are subject to an upper limit. The STI is limited to 200% of the target amount and the maximum number of performance stock options is limited to 150% of the performance stock options originally allocated.

Secondly, the Management Board members' total remuneration, i.e. total non-performance-based remuneration (basic salary and incidental benefits) plus performance-based remuneration components (STI and LTI), is limited by the maximum remuneration under Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act. The maximum remuneration limits the total remuneration paid out for one financial year irrespective of the actual payout date. It thus also represents an absolute limit on possible payouts under the LTI.

Notwithstanding the uniform maximum remuneration of EUR 2,000,000 per member of the Management Board provided for in the remuneration system, a maximum remuneration of EUR 1,716,000 was stipulated for Mr. Mümmler in his individual contract. As a result, the ratio of maximum remuneration to target remuneration for the CFO is the same as that for the CEO. The reason for this adjustment is to ensure that both members of the Executive Board receive an identical fair value when share options are allocated as part of the LTI.

As can be seen from the table "guaranteed and owed compensation", the maximum compensation provided for in the compensation system was adhered to for all members of the Management Board for the 2025 financial year.

2.5 SHARE OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES

The remuneration system contains share ownership guidelines (SOG) in order to further align the interests of Management Board members and shareholders and to strengthen the share culture at LPKF. The members of the Management Board are required to invest 100% of their gross basic remuneration in LPKF shares (SOG target) and to hold these shares until they leave the Management Board or begin a release from duties. The SOG target is calculated based on the gross basic remuneration at the beginning of the period of service as a Management Board member or the gross basic remuneration on the date the SOG came into effect.

When the SOG came into effect, a SOG target of EUR 300,000 has been agreed for Dr. Fiedler. This amount corresponds to 100% of the gross base remuneration at the beginning of the term of office as Chair of the Management Board in the 2022 financial year. Starting in fiscal year 2025, the SOG target for Dr. Fiedler will increase to EUR 350,000. This amount is decisive for the exercise of stock options from the Performance Stock Option Plan that will be allocated starting in fiscal year 2025. For Mr. Mümmler, the SOG target is EUR 300,000.

Until the SOG target is reached, the members of the Management Board must invest at least 50% of the net STI payment per year. As a further restriction, the Management Board members may only exercise performance stock options from the LTI if the SOG target has been met, even if the waiting period for such performance stock options has already expired.

Share Ownership Guidelines					
	SOG target amount in €k	Status quo 31.12.24 in €k	Investment Volume 2025 in €k	Status quo 31.12.25 in €k	in % of shareholding requirement
Dr. Klaus Fiedler	350	40	20	60	17%
Peter Mümmler	300	0	95	95	32%

2.6 PENALTIES/CLAWBACK

The remuneration system for the Management Board also contains penalty and clawback provisions. Under certain circumstances, the Supervisory Board is authorized to reduce performance-based remuneration that has not yet been paid out (penalty) or reclaim performance-based remuneration that has already been paid out (clawback).

If performance-based remuneration was calculated and paid out on the basis of misstatements in the annual financial statements, the Supervisory Board can reclaim the difference to the relevant performance-based remuneration as calculated on the basis of the corrected annual financial statements.

In the event of an intentional breach of duty by a Management Board member in the form of

- non-compliance with material provisions of the LPKF code of conduct and/or a material obligation under the employment contract or
- a material breach of due diligence obligations within the meaning of Section 93 of the German Stock Corporation Act,

the Supervisory Board can reduce or reclaim performance-based remuneration at its reasonable discretion.

The possibility of reclaiming performance-based remuneration that has already been paid out applies to payouts that have been made no more than three years previously.

In the 2025 financial year, the Supervisory Board did not establish any reason to make use of the possibility provided by the remuneration system to reduce or reclaim variable remuneration components.

2.7 REMUNERATION-RELATED EVENTS

2.7.1 BENEFITS UPON DEPARTURE

When appointing Management Board members and with regard to the duration of Management Board employment contracts, the Supervisory Board complies with the provisions of Section 84 of the German Stock Corporation Act and with the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code. Management Board employment contracts are concluded for the period of the respective appointment. Initial appointments are generally for three years, while the maximum period for a reappointment is five years. Management Board employment contracts can include an ordinary option of termination on both sides. The mutual right to terminate employment contracts without notice for cause always remains unaffected.

2.7.1.1 SEVERANCE PAYMENT

The Management Board employment contracts may provide for severance payments in the event that the company terminates the employment contract early without good cause for which the Management Board member is responsible or in the event that the Management Board member terminates the employment contract early for good cause for which the company is responsible. In such a case, the Management Board member may receive a severance payment of two years' annual remuneration, up to a maximum amount of the remuneration due for the remaining term of the contract after the end of the notice period. This severance payment will count toward any compensation that may be granted in connection with the post-contractual non-competition clause.

The Management Board employment contracts do not provide for severance payments in the event that the company terminates the employment contract early for good cause for which the Management Board member is responsible or in the event that a Management Board member initiates

the termination themselves without good cause for which the company is responsible. Furthermore, all vested and non-vested performance stock options allocated in connection with the LTI shall be forfeited without compensation.

If the Management Board contract is terminated, the outstanding variable remuneration components not yet paid relating to the period before the end of the contract will generally be paid in accordance with the originally agreed targets and comparative parameters and in accordance with the due dates or holding periods stipulated in the contract. A pro rata share of the entitlement to STI will be deducted in these cases. LTI entitlements are dependent on the circumstances of the departure. A pro rata share of the entitlement to LTI will be deducted in a contractually defined “good leaver event,” and all rights and entitlements will be lost in a “bad leaver event.”

2.7.1.2 CHANGE OF CONTROL

In the event of a change of control, Management Board members have a one-time special right to terminate their employment contract with a notice period of six months, to end at the end of a month, and the option to step down from their mandate on the termination date. If the contract is terminated in this way, the Management Board member is entitled to the severance payment described above.

The contractually agreed provisions, dates and holding periods shall continue to apply to any performance stock options already vested at the time of the termination. Other provisions may apply in the event that the LTI can no longer reasonably be continued, e.g. in the case of a delisting.

2.7.1.3 RELEASE FROM DUTIES

In the event of termination of an appointment as a member of the Management Board or as CEO for cause in accordance with Section 84 (3) of the German Stock Corporation Act or in the event of resignation, the company may immediately release the member of the Management Board from their obligation to perform their duties while continuing to pay their salary.

2.7.1.4 POST-CONTRACTUAL NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE – COMPENSATION

All members of the Management Board must observe a post-contractual non-competition clause lasting for six months after the end of their employment contracts. LPKF has an obligation to pay Management Board members monthly compensation of 50% (gross) of the average monthly basic remuneration they received in the last 12 months prior to their departure for the duration of the post-contractual non-competition clause. The leave compensation is to be credited against other payments made by LPKF to the member of the Management Board, such as transition payments and severance payments.

2.7.1.5 PROVISIONS ON PENSIONS AND EARLY RETIREMENT

LPKF does not offer any pension or early retirement schemes for members of the Management Board.

As such, there were no pension commitments for members of the Management Board who were in office in the 2025 financial year.

Pension commitments exist for former members of the board of directors and their surviving dependents (old-age, disability, and widow's pension).

2.7.1.6 CONTINUED PAYMENT OF REMUNERATION IN THE EVENT OF DEATH

If the appointment of a member of the Management Board ends early on account of their death while in office, the fixed monthly remuneration shall still be paid to their heirs for a period of three months.

All current LTI tranches will be paid out immediately if the appointment ends due to permanent disability or death.

2.7.2 PAYMENTS FROM THIRD PARTIES

No members of the Management Board were promised or granted payments from a third party in respect of their work as a member of the Management Board in the past financial year.

2.7.3 REMUNERATION FOR WORK ON SUPERVISORY BOARDS OR SIMILAR BODIES

The tasks of Management Board members also include the fulfillment of executive duties at affiliated companies within the meaning of Section 15 et seq. of the German Stock Corporation Act. The performance of such activities is fully compensated for with the compensation.

2.8 COMPENSATION GRANTED AND OWED IN THE 2024 FINANCIAL YEAR

2.8.1 CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD

The following tables show the remuneration granted and owed to the current members of the Management Board, including the relative share of the remuneration components in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act. Remuneration granted and owed in accordance with Section 162 (1) sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act is stated in the financial year in which the underlying activity for the remuneration was fully completed ("granted") or became due but has not yet been fulfilled ("owed"). This includes basic salary paid in the financial year, incidental benefits accrued in the financial year and STI earned in the financial year. In contrast, the LTI is only included in the total compensation in the year in which a payable amount is determined.

Accordingly, the compensation reported for the 2025 financial year consists of:

- Basic salary paid in the 2025 financial year;
- incidental benefits received in the 2025 financial year;
- STI set for the financial year 2025, which will be paid out in the financial year 2026.

Remuneration awarded and due according to § 162 AktG - Current Management Board members

	Dr. Klaus Fiedler (CEO) (since 1 January 2022)				Peter Mümmler (CFO) (since 1 April 2025)			
	2025		2024		2025		2024	
	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %
Base salary	350	88	350	89	225	84	-	-
Fringe benefits	18	5	6,6	2	23	9	-	-
Total non-performance-based remuneration	368	93	357	91	248	93	-	-
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)								
STI 2024	-	-	35	9	-	-	-	-
STI 2025	29	7	-	-	19	7	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)								
LTI 2023	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total performance-based remuneration	29	7	35	9	19	7	0	-
Total remuneration awarded and due according to Section 162 AktG	397	100	392	100	267	100	-	-

2.8.2 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD

The following table contains the fixed and variable remuneration components granted and owed to former members of the Management Board who have ceased their activities within the last ten financial years, including the respective relative share in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The compensation reported for the financial year 2025 includes only the benefits received.

Remuneration awarded and due according to § 162 AktG - Former Management Board members

	Bernd Hackmann (CEO until 31 December 2008) (Member of Supervisory Board until 12 July 2017)				Bernd Hildebrandt (CEO until 17 May 2001) (Chairman of Supervisory Board until 31 May 2012)			
	2025		2024		2025		2024	
	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %
Base salary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fringe benefits	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total non-performance-based remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total performance-based remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pension Benefits	12	100	12	-	17	100	17	100
Total remuneration awarded and due according to Section 162 AktG	12	100	12	100	17	100	17	100

3. COMPENSATION OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD

The current remuneration system for the members of the Supervisory Board, as well as the amount of the Supervisory Board remuneration, was reviewed in the 2023 financial year with the support of an external, independent expert regarding its market conformity and competitiveness, and was subsequently revised. The revised remuneration system was approved by the 2023 Annual General Meeting with a majority of 97.45% of the votes and came into effect on 18 May 2023.

Below is an overview of the core elements of the remuneration system.

Remuneration system from 2023			
Fixed basic remuneration	Chairman of the Supervisory Board		EUR 70,000
	Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board		EUR 52,500
	Member of the Supervisory Board		EUR 35,000
	Ratio		2 : 1.5 : 1
Committee remuneration	Audit, Risk & ESG Committee	Chairman EUR 15,000	Member EUR 7,500
	Remuneration and Nomination Committee	EUR 10,000	EUR 5,000
	Strategy Committee	EUR 10,000	EUR 5,000
	EUR 1,000 for attending a meeting of the Supervisory Board and EUR 500 for attending a meeting of the Supervisory Board Committee, whether in person, by telephone or virtually. Attendance fees are only paid once for several meetings held on the same day.		
Attendance fee			

The remuneration system for the Supervisory Board takes account of the responsibilities and scope of activities of the members of the Supervisory Board. By monitoring the Management Board's consultation on and management of the company as incumbent upon it, the Supervisory Board helps to promote the business strategy and the company's long-term development.

The remuneration system for the Supervisory Board is regulated in Article 18 of the Articles of Incorporation. The respective amount of the fixed compensation takes into account the specific function and responsibility of the members of the Supervisory Board. The greater amount of time required by the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board to carry out their work is adequately reflected in higher basic remuneration. In addition, the greater amount of time required by the members of the committees of the Supervisory Board to carry out their work is adequately reflected in additional remuneration. The Chair of a committee receives a higher additional compensation due to the higher workload and additional responsibility. A distinction is made between the audit, risk and ESG committees and other committees.

Each member of the Supervisory Board receives a fixed basic remuneration of EUR 35,000 for each full financial year of their membership of the Supervisory Board. The Chair of the Supervisory Board receives double (EUR 70,000) and the Vice-Chair receives one and a half times (EUR 52,500) the fixed basic remuneration. Members of the Audit, Risk and ESG Committee receive an additional compensation of EUR 7,500, and members of other committees receive an additional compensation

of EUR 5,000 each. The chairman of each committee receives double the amount of the additional compensation each time.

Members of the Supervisory Board who do not belong to the Supervisory Board for a full financial year or who hold the chairmanship or deputy chairmanship of the Supervisory Board or the chairmanship or membership of a committee receive a pro-rata compensation.

In addition, the members of the Supervisory Board receive a meeting fee of EUR 1,000 for each attendance – whether in person, by telephone or virtually – at a meeting of the Supervisory Board, and a meeting fee of EUR 500 for a meeting of its committees. For several meetings that take place on the same day, the meeting fee is only paid once.

The members of the Supervisory Board will also be reimbursed for all expenses and the value added tax payable on their compensation and expenses.

For the benefit of the members of the Supervisory Board, liability insurance can be taken out to cover the risks arising from the performance of their duties as a Supervisory Board member (Directors and Officers Liability Insurance - D&O Insurance) with a total premium of up to EUR 30,000.

Compensation granted and owed in the 2025 financial year

The remuneration components granted and owed to current and former Supervisory Board members in the 2025 financial year, including the respective relative share in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act, are shown below.

Remuneration awarded and due according to § 162 AktG - Supervisory Board members											
	Fixed remuneration			Committee remuneration			Attendance fee			Total remuneration	
	2025		2024	2025		2024	2025		2024	2025	2024
	in €k	in %	in €k	in €k	in %	in €k	in €k	in %	in €k	in €k	in €k
Jean-Michel Richard Chair (until 4 June 2025)	35	74	70	6	13	13	6	13	17	47	99
Alexa Siebert Chair (since 5 June 2025)	55	62	35	21	23	20	13	14	14	89	69
Dr. Dirk Michael Rothweiler Deputy Chair	53	70	53	11	14	15	12	16	15	76	83
Prof. Ludger Overmeyer	35	73	35	3	6	5	10	21	12	48	52
Paul Owsianowski (since 5 June 2025)	20	65	0	4	14	0	7	21	0	31	0
Anka Wittenberg	35	53	35	18	27	18	13	20	17	66	69

The individually granted and owed compensation corresponds fully to the compensation system described.

4. COMPARISON OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REMUNERATION AND INCOME

The table below shows a comparison of the development of Management Board and Supervisory Board remuneration with the development of LPKF's income and the development of average remuneration for employees on a full-time equivalents basis.

The disclosures for the Management Board and Supervisory Board are based on remuneration granted and owed within the meaning of Section 162 (1) sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act.

The remuneration for employees takes into account the average remuneration for staff of the LPKF Group in Germany. To ensure comparability, only employees and executives within the meaning of Section 5 (3) of the German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) who are employed in Germany were taken into account. In addition, remuneration for part-time staff has been extrapolated into full-time equivalents.

Comparable Presentation

Annual change in remuneration and earnings												
	2025	2024	Change 2025 / 2024		Change 2024 / 2023		Change 2023 / 2022		Change 2022 / 2021		Change 2021 / 2020	
	in €k	in €k	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %	in €k	in %
Current members of the Management Board												
Dr. Klaus Fiedler	397	392	5	1	24	6	-50	-12	418	-	-	-
Peter Mümmler	267	-	267	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Former members of the Management Board												
Bernd Hackmann	12	12	0	-	0	-	12	-	-	-	-	-
Bernd Hildebrandt	17	17	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
Christian Witt	0	405	-405	-100	54	15	-145	-29	60	14	217	99
Members of the Supervisory Board												
Alexa Siebert	89	69	20	30	33	90	36	-	-	-	-	-
Dr. Dirk Michael Rothweiler	76	83	-7	-8	15	21	17	32	3	5	1	2
Prof. Ludger Overmeyer	48	52	-4	-7	9	20	11	34	0	0	0	0
Paul Owsianowski	31	0	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anka Wittenberg	66	69	-4	-5	29	73	40	-	-	-	-	-
Former members of the Supervisory Board												
Julia Kranenberg	0	0	0	-	-13	-100	-23	-63	16	81	20	-
Jean-Michel Richard	47	99	-52	-52	15	18	15	22	4	6	59	995
Development of earnings												
Net revenue in €m (Group)	115.329	122.890	-7.561	-6	-1.447	-1	638	1	30.131	32	-2.688	-3
EBIT in €m (Group)	-13.522	-2.529	-10.993	-435	-6.222	-168	-3.086	-46	6.720	11312	-7.479	-99
Net income according to HGB in €m (LPKF SE)	-10.002	-4.812	-5.190	-108	-3.602	-298	-1.210	-	-1.388	-100	-2.414	-63
Average remuneration of employees												
Employees (FTE) in Germany	63	61	1	2	3	4	5	9	3	7	-1	-2

5. OUTLOOK FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026

Structure and Targets for 2026

The current remuneration system, approved by the 2023 Annual General Meeting, is not expected to be adjusted in fiscal year 2026. The amount of short-term incentive (STI) for the 2026 fiscal year remains unchanged at 40% of the total variable target remuneration and is based on the individual achievement of personal and corporate goals. The exact targets for the short-term component for 2026 will be disclosed retrospectively in the 2026 Remuneration Report.

Long-term incentive (LTI) remuneration will continue to account for 60% of total variable target remuneration and will consist of long-term financial and ESG targets closely linked to LPKF's corporate strategy. The weightings of the ROCE, TSR, and ESG targets will remain unchanged in 2026. The exact targets and thresholds for the 2026 LTI tranche will be disclosed retrospectively in the 2026 Remuneration Report. The 2026 LTI will be granted as genuine stock options in the form of Performance Stock Options (PSOs), utilizing the contingent capital created to service subscription rights.

Garbsen, 25 March 2026

LPKF Laser & Electronics SE

The Management Board

Dr. Klaus Fiedler

Peter Mümmler

Chair of the Supervisory Board

Alexa Siebert